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Abstract
Current approaches for authorization on Web servers
are mostly based on a predefined set of users or domains.
They are not suitable for Internet Web sites where the
user set is unbounded and authorized users can be non-
predefined. We propose an authorization approach that
applies Role-based access control (RBAC) to WWW.
Under this approach, system administrators predefine
roles, role-permission relations and the policies that
assign roles to users (user-role assignment policy). The
system automatically collects trustworthy information
(valid evidence) and assigns roles to Internet users
according to user-role assignment policies.
Trustworthiness information plays an important role in
user-role assignment. The validity of evidence is assessed
based on the trustworthiness information of the evidence
provider. In addition, system administrators can specify
the trustworthiness constraints that users have to satisfy
for holding roles. In this paper, the schema of using
RBAC on the Web and the procedure of user-role
assignment are presented. The classification and
evaluation of trustworthiness are discussed.
1. Introduction
     
WWW as an open environment provides a tremendous
opportunity to share information and provide services to a
large scale of users. However, authorization of Internet
Web sites becomes more complex than traditional closed
systems mainly due to the following factors:
•  Unbounded user set: In traditional systems, the number
of users is bounded. It enables user based access
controls such as Access Control List (ACL) to be used.
Applying user based access controls in the Web suffers
from scalability issues, as the size of the users set is not
bound.
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•  Non-predefined but authorized users: It is possible that
an authorized user of Internet Web sites is non-
predefined (e.g. the application example in [1]). New
users are continuously introduced to the system and
granted different permissions.
•  Less prior knowledge about users: In traditional
systems, permissions are granted to a user by system
administrators based on the prior knowledge about the
user (e.g. the user’s job function or job title within the
organization). In the Web, strangers are introduced to
the system on the fly, which introduces the need to
collect information about users (e.g. user’s identity, age
and job) and assign permissions to strangers according
to the knowledge users accumulated by the system
about users.
Current approaches for authorization on Web servers
are mostly based on a predefined set of users or domains.
They are not suitable for Internet Web sites where the
user set is unbounded and authorized users can be non-
predefined [3].
We propose an authorization approach that applies
Role-based access control (RBAC) to WWW. RBAC is a
promising technology for managing and enforcing
security in large-scale systems [2]. The basic notion of
RBAC is that permissions are associated with roles, and
users are assigned appropriate roles. Security
administration consists of two independent parts: role-
permission assignment and user-role assignment. RBAC
can support access control on Internet Web sites. System
administrators predefine roles, role-permission relations
and the policies that map users to roles, instead of
predefining users and user-permission relations. The
Internet users are assigned roles based on the mapping
polices. A user’s permission set is determined by the roles
he holds.
Most research works on RBAC focus on closed
enterprise-wide systems, where user-role assignment is
relatively simple [2]. A user is assigned roles according to
his specific job responsibilities in the enterprise manually
or automatically [3,4]. For Internet Web sites, user-role
assignment is much more complex. Unbounded user set
makes it difficult, if not impossible, for system
administrators to assign roles to individual users manually.Before assigning a role to a user, Web sites need to collect
i n f o r m a t i o ns u c ha st h eu s e r ’s age, job, etc. from different
information sources (e.g. trusted third parties, local
database, etc.) to verify that the user qualifies for the role
according to the policies that map users to roles. For
security reason, high privilege roles should be assigned to
trustworthy users whom the system believes not to be
defect. Web sites form trust opinions on users by
receiving references from trusted intermediaries,
analyzing users’ interactions with system, etc. Our
research investigates automatic user-role assignment on
WWW. Trustworthiness information that is automatically
assessed by the system is used in user-role assignment.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes related research. Section 3 describes our
schema. Assigning roles to users is presented in section 4.
Section 5 discusses the assessment of trustworthiness.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Related work
RBAC has rapidly emerged in the 1990s as a promising
technology for managing and enforcing security in large-
scale enterprise-wide systems. J. Park and R. Sandhu
present a comprehensive approach to apply RBAC on the
web by using technologies such as secure cookies and
smart certificates [3]. However, their research is in the
context of enterprise-wide system. They assume that the
system administrator assign users to roles on the basis of
users’ job responsibilities in the enterprise.
In [1], A. Herzberg et all. propose an approach to map
Internet users to predefined business roles based on public
key certificates issued by third parties. The most
important difference between their approach and ours is
that the former does not consider trustworthiness of users
and certificate issuers.
Among the significant body of research on trust
management, the trust model and subject logic proposed
by A. J∅ sang are close to our work [5,6,7].
3. Schema
Figure 1 shows a schema of using RBAC on the web.
We distinguish two main components: Role server and
RBAC enhanced web server.
Role server (figure 1) is responsible for assigning roles
to a user: (1) determining the roles assigned to a user, (2)
creating and signing a statement specifying the roles
assigned, (3) sending the statement to the user’s machine.
Statements should have two properties: (1) a user can
prove that he is the owner of a statement. Since
statements are stored in the user’s machine, it is
convenient for users to copy statements of other users. For
this reason, when a user presents a statement, the system
should verify that he is the statement owner. (2)
Statements are short-lived. For each statement, its validity
is limited by an expiration date. Problems arise when
system administrators want to revoke the roles held in a
statement before it expires. A revocation scheme
determining whether a certificate has been revoked can be
used. However, we do not prefer revocation schemes for
simplicity and performance reasons. If statements expire
in hours or days, a revocation scheme is not necessary
[10]. Therefore, we use short-term statements. Secure
cookies and smart certificates are ideal forms of the
statements. The technologies of secure cookies or smart
certificates are discussed in [3].
The RBAC enhanced web server (figure 1) is a web
server with role based access control. A reference
implementation of an RBAC web server has been
provided by National Institute of Standards and
Technology [2].
If a user wants to access resources in a Web site, the
Web site prompts what role(s) he should have. If the user
has been assigned the role(s), he selects the proper
statement that shows he holds the role(s) and sends it to
the Web server. The Web server verifies the validity and
the ownership of the statement. If all the checks are
passed, the Web server returns the requested resources to
the user.
If a user does not have the proper role(s) or the
statement has expired, the user is directed to role server,
which checks if the user qualifies for the role(s), as we
discuss in Section 4.
In the process discussed above, a role is assigned to a
user when the user needs it. As we discussed in section 1,
the system may collect necessary user information from
third parties such as public key certificates. The overhead
of collecting process could be large since several chains
of certificates may be followed. In addition, the required
certificate set of different roles can be overlapped. In
order to make best use of the information collected, we
provide a pre-assignment mode. In this mode, we assume
that resources on a Web site are categorized. A category-
role table is needed. For each information category, there
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Figure 1 Use RBAC on the WWWis one row in the table storing the roles accessing the
resources in the category. We also assume the existence
of a user-modeling component that generates users’
interested information categories. In a pre-assigning
process, the system first determines a set of roles possibly
required by a user based on his preferences and the
category-role table. We call this set R1. Then, the system
determines the roles for which the user qualifies in R1.
Example: Table 1 illustrates an example of category-role
table. If Alice is interested in Health and Education, R1=
{Doctor, Cardiologist, Oncologist, Student, Faculty,
Principal}. The system checks what roles in R1 should be
assigned to Alice.
Table 1 An example of category-role table
Category Role1 Role2 Rolen
Health Doctor Cardiologist Oncologist
Education Student Faculty Principal
Business CEO Sales
Manager
VIP
Customer
4. Assigning role(s) to user(s)
The main responsibility of the role server is to assign
roles to users. Unlike [1], we consider various information
sources for assignment in addition to public key
certificates. Furthermore, trustworthiness information is
used. When a user provides signed statement (e.g.
certificates) issued by a third party, the issuer’s
trustworthiness determines how much the statement can
be trusted. System administrators specify the minimum
trustworthiness value required for holding this role. The
system assigns roles to users satisfying required
constraints including trustworthiness constraints. Details
of trustworthiness classification and evaluation are
discussed in section 5.
4.1 Information sources
The information sources we consider can be classified
as the followings:
1.A statement on the properties of the user made by
known intermediaries. For example, a hospital wants to
make some of its online resources available for health
professionals from other hospitals. In order to access
these resources, a user should provide a public-key
certificate signed by another hospital, which proves that
he is a doctor. This type of information is presented to
the system as public-key based certificates [1]. The
certificates coming from intermediaries cannot be 100%
trusted. The reasons are: first, the intermediaries may
not be honest; second, it is possible that a statement
made by an honest intermediary cannot be directly used.
For example, the system asks other website how much
a user can be trusted. Two trustworthy websites may
make very different conclusions because they use
different evaluation criteria. A characteristic of our
system is to consider how much a certificate can be
trusted when using it for role assignment.
2.Information provided by users through interactive
dialogues. For example, when a new user registers in a
website, he is prompted to a set of questions (i.e.
survey) related to his personal information. An example
of smart user-modeling agent was proposed in [9]. Its
main functionalities consist of generating the survey,
verifying users’ answers, and describing users’
characteristics by using a set of field variables. We
assume the existence of a similar user-modeling agent
in our system.
3.Analysis of a user’s interactions with the system. The
system analyses Web logs to discover security events,
summarizes users’ behavior and adjusts the
trustworthiness of users based on these results. For
example, a user frequently attempting to access
unauthorized data is considered as a potentially harmful
user and his roles with high privileges may be revoked.
The security events to be controlled are described as
associated rules or sequential patterns [8]. Another
example is that a user who has purchased many items
on a commercial web site is assigned to a role with high
privileges. For instance, the user is granted to access
coupons that are only provided to selective users.
4.2 Assigning process
Figure 2 shows the procedure of assigning a role to a
user.
Step 1. Information with different formats (e.g. public
key certificates or membership relations stored in
local databases) is first transformed into the
common interface of evidence by the evidence
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Figure 2 Assigning process
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Legitimacy
Evaluationmanager (figure 2). Evidence is a 3-tuple <issuer,
user, statement> representing a statement
provided by an issuer on a user. An issuer can be
an intermediary or the local system.
Step 2. Evidence is presented to legitimacy evaluation
module (figure 2) that generates a 2-tuple
<evidence, legitimacy>. The field of legitimacy
indicates the degree to which the system believes
that the corresponding evidence is true. It is a
numerical number ∈ [0,1]. The higher the value,
the more the system thinks the associated
evidence is convincing. A legitimacy field is
evaluated by using the issuer’s trustworthiness
information.
Step 3. <evidence, legitimacy> is provided to role
assignment module (figure 2). Au s e ri sa s s i g n e d
appropriate roles based on the 2-tuples,
assignment policies and trustworthiness
threshold specified by system administrators. For
each role, a set of assignment policies defines the
content and number of evidences needed for the
assignment. The policies also specify the
minimum legitimacy of the evidences
(legitimacy threshold). If the legitimacy of
evidence provided to the system is smaller than
the minimum legitimacy, this evidence is
considered as invalid. It helps us to control the
validity of the evidence. System administrators
can specify that legitimacy threshold of
evidences for assigning a role with high
privileges is higher than that for assigning a role
with low privileges. The trustworthiness
threshold specifies the minimum trustworthiness
that a user should have within the system to get a
role. In this step, the role assignment module
needs to assess a user’s trustworthiness. For a
new user, the assessment is based on the
evidences (e.g. credit rating from third parties)
and policies (e.g. All user from domain X has
initial trustworthiness value of 0.8). For a known
user, his trustworthiness is a function of the
original trustworthiness, evidences and policies.
A role is assigned to a user only if the user
provides necessary valid evidences and has high
enough trustworthiness. This step assigns roles
to a user and stores his trustworthiness
information into trustworthiness information
database.
5. Trustworthiness
Trustworthiness plays an important role in our approach.
A sd e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n4 ,a ni s s u e r ’s trustworthiness
information is used to determine the degree to which a
statement made by the issuer is trusted. On the other hand,
au s e r ’s trustworthiness is considered before roles are
assigned to him. Intuitively, the trustworthiness in the
former case is different from that in the latter case. In this
section, we discuss the classification and evaluation of
trustworthiness.
5.1 Trustworthiness Classification
We classify the roles into two types to simplify the
design. We describe the role classification before
discussing trustworthiness classification.
•  Authority role: Making statements on certain properties
of other users is one type of privileges that is only
assigned to authority roles. The system only accepts the
statements made by authority roles. Before accepting
the certificates from an intermediary, the system checks
whether the intermediary holds the proper authority role.
For example, an intermediary can certify a user’s
identity as health professional only if it holds the
authority role of hospital. An authority role has no
permission to access the resources on the website (e.g.
read or write documents). If a user needs both types of
privileges (i.e. making statements and accessing the
website), he must be assigned access roles as well as
authority roles.
•  Access role: A user must have access roles to access the
documents on the Web. Different permission sets are
associated with access roles.
The implications of trustworthiness of a user acting as
authority roles and acting as access roles are different.
The trustworthiness of a user acting as access roles is
defined as clearance of the user. The trustworthiness of a
user acting as authority roles is his sign trust.
•  Clearance: clearance is a numerical number ∈ [0,1]. It
represents the degree to which the website believes that
a user will not do harm to the system (e.g. not
disclosing sensitive data, not attempting to access
unauthorized data). The higher the clearance is, the
more the system believes that the user is trustworthy
and valuable. Clearance is accumulated gradually over
time. It drops sharply if harmful actions or potential
harmful actions are discovered. In addition, system
administrators can specify the policies to raise
clearance as award to a user’s contributions (e.g. the
clearance of a user may increase as loyalty award for
the user’s purchase). We revoke roles with high
privileges from hostile users and secure the system by
using clearance.
Example: A new user with certificates from a trusted
hospital asks for the role of doctor whose minimal
trustworthiness is 0.5. Assume the user’si n i t i a l
clearance is 0.75. He can get the role. The system
assigns the doctor role to the user by storing a secure
cookie on his machine. When the secure cookie expires,
role server checks if the user qualifies for the role.
Assume the user’s clearance drops to 0.3. Although hestill holds required certificates, he cannot get the role
since his clearance is smaller than the threshold 0.5.
•  Sign trust: sign trust is a numerical number ∈ [0,1]. It
indicates the degree to which the system believes the
statements made by the user are true. The higher the
sign trust is, the more the system believes the user’s
statements. One important reason we introduce sign
trust is that the conditions under which certification
authorities issue certificates are different [7]. Most
certification authorities state the conditions in
Certification Practice Statements (CPS), which is a
piece of lengthy and complex prose text. Instead of
assessing CPS automatically to set sign trust, we
attempt to use a simple approach to capture the
difference. The idea is that an issuer’s sign trust is
adjusted based on the behaviors of the users introduced
by the issuer. The following example explains this idea.
A professor has recommended ten students to a
graduate school. All students have poor academic
performance. The recommendation letters from this
professor become less convincing consequently.
5.3 Trustworthiness Evaluation
Clearance Evaluation:
•  Initial values: The initial value of clearance is computed
when a user gets the first access role by using the
default values for the access role specified by the
system administrator. We also consider the following
factors if applicable: (1) the default clearance value
associated with the domain/subnet from which the user
comes (e.g. requestors outside United States may be
assigned a different clearance value from those coming
from United States), (2) the statements on clearance
properties provided by intermediaries, (3) the results
generated by the user-modeling agent.
•  Adjustment: The system scans the Web log periodically
and uses threshold-based approach or rule-based
approach to detect “harmful behavior” (e.g. 10 attempts
to access secure documents) and “suspicious behavior”
(e.g. frequent request the online coupons without
purchasing anything). System administrators specify
penalty values for each type of misbehavior. The
clearance values of misbehavior users decrease by
certain penalty values. System administrators also
determine the reward values. For those who do not
behave in a harmful or suspicious manner, the clearance
values should rise.
Sign_trust Evaluation:
•  Initial value: Initially, sign trust is set when a user gets
the first authority role by using the default values for
the authority role specified by the system administrator.
•  Adjustment: The sign trust of a user u is modified
periodically together with the modification of clearance.
Suppose u1,u 2, … un are assigned to access roles based
on the certificate signed by u. The modification of sign
trust of u is related with the changes of clearances of ui
(1≤ i ≤ n). We consider the behaviors of the users
introduced into the system by u when modifying the
sign trust of u.
Formula:
δ (sign trust(u)) = sign trust(u) – previous_ sign trust(u)
δ (sign trust(u)) = f(δ (clearance(u1)), δ (clearance(u2)),
… δ (clearance(un)), n)
δ (clearance(ui)) = clearance (ui) – previous_clearance(ui)
where (1≤ i ≤ n)
6. Conclusion
We present a new authorization approach on WWW.
This approach utilizes RBAC for access control. Our
research focuses on user-role assignment. Roles are
automatically assigned to users based on user-role
assignment policies. Especially, we mimic real-world
assessment of trustworthiness in an automated fashion
and usetheassessment resultsin theuser-roleassignment.
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